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Abstract
This Note argues that constructive wrongful expulsion can result from state-inspired propaganda implemented by mobs that evolve into a sucesful revolutionary movement. Part I discusses
the recent decisions of the Tribunal. Part II examines the generally-accepted principles of international law used in determining what constitutes unlawful conduct by a state and in attributing that
conduct to a state. Part III proposes that the elements of state responsibility can be fulfilled under
circumstances similar to those created during the Islamic Revolution.

STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSTRUCTIVE
WRONGFUL EXPULSION OF FOREIGN

NATIONALS
INTRODUCTION

In February 1979, the events of the Islamic Revolution in
Iran led to the departure of thousands of U.S. nationals from
the country.' The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal ("the
Tribunal") was established 2 to address claims arising out of the
Islamic Revolution, including small claims 3 resulting from the
alleged expulsion of U.S. nationals.4 Approximately 1500
small claims have been filed with the Tribunal in which U.S.
nationals allege that they were wrongfully expelled from Iran. 5
Each of the three Chambers 6 of the Tribunal recently decided a wrongful expulsion case.7 The claimants in these cases
1. The Khomeini Era Begins, TIME, Feb. 12, 1979, at 33, 38-39; 1,350 Americans
Evacuated, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1979, at A12, col. 2.
2. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, 81
Dep't St. Bull. 3 [hereinafter Claims Settlement Agreement], reprinted in 20 I.L.M.
230.
3. Small claims are claims of less than US$250,000, which are presented by the
claimants' government on their behalf. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 2,
art. 111(3), 81 Dep't St. Bull. at 4, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. at 231.
4. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, arts. II(l), 111(3), 81 Dep't St.
Bull. at 3, 4, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. at 230-31.
5. Letter from Charles N. Brower to Jacqueline 0. LiCalzi (Nov. 30, 1987)
(available at the Fordham InternationalLaw Journaloffice) (discussing the recent awards
by the Tribunal in wrongful expulsion cases).
6. The Tribunal is composed of nine members who are distributed among three
"Chambers" or panels of arbitrators. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 2,
art. III(l), 81 Dep't St. Bull. at 4, reprintedin 20 I.L.M. at 231. Pursuant to the Claims
Settlement Agreement, the United States and Iran appointed three arbitrators each.
Id. Those six appointees then chose three third-country arbitrators. Id.; see also
Fagre, InternationalAgreements: Settlement of Claims Outstanding Between the United States
and Iran, 22 HARV. INT'L LJ. 443, 446-47 (1981) (discussing the composition of the
Tribunal and how it may adjudicate claims). The Tribunal is divided into three
Chambers to arbitrate private and official claims, with a U.S. arbitrator, an Iranian
arbitrator, and a third-country arbitrator in each. Stewart & Sherman, Developments at
the lran-UnitedStates Claims Tribunal. 1981-1983, 24 VA.J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (1984). Article
III(l) of the Claims Settlement Agreement provides that "Icilaims may be decided by
the full Tribunal or by a panel of three members of the Tribunal as the President
shall determine." 81 Dep't St. Bull. at 4, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. at 231.
7. Rankin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 326-10913-2 (Iran-U.S. Claims
Trib. Nov. 3, 1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database); Yeager v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, Award No. 324-10199-1 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Nov. 2, 1987) (WESTLAW,
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sought to hold the Islamic Republic of Iran responsible for
their alleged expulsions, which they claim resulted from circumstances created by the Revolution's anti-American policy. 8
The majority decisions held that the anti-American actions of
the revolutionary movement did not cause the expulsion of
U.S. nationals. 9 The Tribunal found the Islamic Republic responsible only in the situation where it was established that an
identifiable agent of the revolutionary movement caused the
claimant's departure.' 0 Judge Brower," however, argued in
dissent to one of the cases that an individual could be constructively expelled by circumstances resulting from the antiAmerican policy promulgated by Ayatollah
Khomeini, the
2
movement.'
revolutionary
the
of
leader
This Note argues that constructive wrongful expulsion can
result from state-inspired propaganda implemented by mobs
that evolve into a successful revolutionary movement. Part I
discusses the recent decisions of the Tribunal. Part II examines the generally-accepted principles of international law used
in determining what constitutes unlawful conduct by a state
INT-IRAN database); Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 312-11135-3
(Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. July 14, 1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database). Chamber
Two of the Tribunal recently issued a decision in a case in which the claimant sought
reparation for damages incurred as a result of her alleged wrongful expulsion from
Iran in January 1979. Hilt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 354-10427-2 (IranU.S. Claims Trib. Mar. 16, 1988) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database). This decision
will not be discussed in the body of this Note.
8. See Rankin, Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. at 2, 13 (claimant seeks compensation for his wrongful expulsion that allegedly resulted from the anti-American tone
of the Revolution); Yeager, Award No. 324-10199-1, slip. op. at 13-14 (claimant alleges that the increasing anti-American tone promulgated by the Ayatollah, caused
the "de facto" expulsion of U.S. nationals from Iran); Short, Award No. 312-11135-3,
slip. op. at 13-14 (claimant relies on the anti-American declarations of the Ayatollah
as the cause of his expulsion).
9. See Rankin, Award No. 326-10199-1, slip. op. at 23 (claimant did not prove
that the implementation of the anti-American policy of the Islamic Revolution caused
his departure); Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 14 (the revolutionaries'
actions did not cause Short's departure).
10. See Yeager, Award No. 324-10199-1, slip. op. at 15-19. The Iranian arbitrator
issued a separate opinion in which he dissented in part and concurred in part This
opinion is unavailable to the author.
11. The Honorable Charles N. Brower was the United States arbitrator in
Chamber Three of the Tribunal. He is at present with the law firm of White & Case
in Washington, D.C.
12. See Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 13-14 (Brower, J., dissenting).
There was no dissent by the U.S. arbitrator in Chamber Two of the Tribunal, in
Rankin, another case in which a U.S. national was denied any recovery.
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and in attributing that conduct to a state. Part III proposes
that the elements of state responsibility can be fulfilled under
circumstances similar to those created during the Islamic
Revolution.
I. WRONGFUL EXPULSION CASES BEFORE THE IRANUNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
"symbol and architect of the Iranian Revolution,"'" returned
to Iran in triumph after fifteen years of exile. 14 The Ayatollah's
return, on the heels of Shah Reza Pahlavi's departure, marked
5
the end of the Pahlavi dynasty.'
The Ayatollah had announced the formation of a Council
of the Islamic Revolution while in exile, and on February 11,
ten days after his return to Iran, he appointed a provisional
revolutionary government.' 6 He made it clear, however, that
final victory would come only when Iran had rid itself of all
foreign domination.17 Thus, he continued to promulgate antiAmerican rhetoric designed to effect the removal of all U.S.
nationals.'
Consequently, the vast majority of U.S. citizens
still in Iran after February 1 either were forcibly removed from
the country or chose to leave before they were compelled to do
19

SO.

Relations between Iran and the United States continued to
deteriorate throughout 1979.20 On November 4, 1979, after
statements by the Ayatollah and his Foreign Minister urging
13. The Shah Takes His Leave, TIME, Jan. 29, 1979, at 48.
14. Apple, Bakhtiar Warns Foe, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1979, at AI, col. 6.

15. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON FOR. AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY-1979, at 72-73 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY].
16. Id. at 74.
17. Apple, Khomeini Threatens To Arrest Bakhtiar ifHe Stays in Post, N.Y. Time_'s,
Feb. 2, 1979, at Al, col. 6; Apple, Bakhtiar Warns Foe, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1979, at AI,
col. 6; The Shah Takes His Leave, TIME, Jan. 29, 1979, at 48, 49.
18. 1979 U.S. Embassy Occupation 'Divine Chapter', Foreign Broadcast Information
Service Daily Report, South Asia, at 13 (Nov. 4, 1986) (the Ayatollah's statements
reveal that from its inception, the United States was the true foe of the Islamic
Revolution); see also B. RUBIN, PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND IRAN 252, 279, 280, 283, 290 (1980) (discussing Ayatollah's statements and

the resulting radicalization of the Revolution from February 1979 on).
19. The Khomeini Era Begins, supra note 1,at 38-39.
20. CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 15, at 74.
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action against the United States, student militants seized the
United States Embassy in Teheran and took U.S. citizens and
Embassy employees hostage.2 ' When it later appeared that the
Islamic Republic intended to withdraw its assets in the United
States, those assets were frozen by Executive Order. 2 2 InJanuary 1981, the United States and the Islamic Republic concluded the Algiers Accords, whereby the Islamic Republic
agreed to release the hostages and the United States agreed to
return the assets to Iran. 3
The Tribunal was established as part of these agreements
to ensure the resolution of claims of U.S. nationals against the
Islamic Republic. 24 The Tribunal recently issued decisions in
21. Id.; see also Stewart & Sherman, supra note 6, at 1 (the settlement between the
United States and Iran led to the release of 52 American hostages). See generally W.
CHRISTOPHER, AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN (1985).
22. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,279 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 note, at 148 (1982). The Government froze assets in the United States and
abroad worth approximately US$12 billion. Stewart & Sherman, supra note 6, at 2 &
n.8 (discussing the President's freeze on Iranian assets).
23. The Algiers Accords include the Claims Settlement Agreement and the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan.
19, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull. 1 [hereinafter General Declaration], reprinted in 20 I.L.M.
224. The General Declaration provided, inter alia, for the release of the hostages in
exchange for the assets frozen in the United States. 81 Dep't St. Bull. at 1-2, reprinted
in 20 I.L.M. at 224-25. See generally, Fagre, supra note 6, at 443-46 (discussing the
settlement between the United States and Iran that involved the establishment of the
Tribunal); Stewart & Sherman, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing the two agreements).
24. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, art. 11(1), 81 Dep't St. Bull. at 3,
reprinted in 20 I.L.M. at 230-31. U.S. nationals originally pursued their claims against
Iran in U.S. and foreign courts. Stewart & Sherman, supra note 6, at 2-3. As a result,
a large portion of Iranian assets were judicially attached. Id. at 3. Thus, the assets
could not be returned to Iran in exchange for the hostages by simply lifting the
Freeze Order. Id. The resolution of the crisis, therefore, had to include provisions
for adequate compensation to U.S. claimants. Id. The Iranians agreed to the establishment of an international tribunal to ensure adjudication and payment of U.S. nationals' claims against Iran. Id. at 4. The Tribunal was established when Iran and the
United States entered into the Algiers Accords. Id. A security account was funded
with US$1 billion of the frozen assets to assure payments to successful U.S. claimants. General Declaration, supra note 23,
6-7, 81 Dep't St. Bull. at 2, reprinted in 20
I.L.M. at 226. Iran must replenish the account when its balance falls below U.S. $500
million. Id. 7, 81 Dep't St. Bull. at 2, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. at 226; see also Jones, The
Iran-UnitedStates Claims Tribunal: PrivateRights and State Responsibility, 24 VA. J. INT'L L.
259, 269 ("The Tribunal is one part of a larger scheme which was intended to restore
a measure of normality in international relations between Iran and the United
States."); Note, Authority of United States Bankruptcy Courts to Stay InternationalArbitral
Proceedings, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 148, 155 n.47 (1987) (discussing the resolution of
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three wrongful expulsion cases.2 5 In two of the cases, Short v.
Islamic Republic of Iran and Rankin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the
Tribunal did not hold Iran responsible for expelling U.S. nationals because it found that the actions that allegedly caused
the claimants' departures either were not attributable to the
state or were not the cause of their departures.2 6 In the third,
Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the Tribunal found that the
claimant had been wrongfully expelled by agents of the Islamic
Republic. 27 The Tribunal limited the award of damages, however, to those injuries that were a direct result of the agents'
actions. 28 Judge Brower dissented from the decision in Short
the hostage crisis, private claims against Iran, and the return of the frozen assets to
Iran).
The Tribunal is empowered to "decide all cases on the basis of respect for the
law, applying such choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international
law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages
of the trade, contract provisions and changed circumstances." Claims Settlement
Agreement, supra note 2, art. V, 81 Dep't St. Bull. at 4, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. at 232.
The sources of international law generally followed by arbitral tribunals are set forth
in article 38(I)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is "regarded as a complete statement of the sources of international law." I. BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 3 (3d ed. 1979). That article includes:
"international conventions," "international custom," and "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations." Id.; see also id. at 1-32 (discussing the sources of
international law in detail).
25. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. In December 1983, the Tribunal
chose test cases designed to facilitate the resolution of small claims involving similar
issues. United States ex rel. Hernandez v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 11762
(Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. June 4, 1986) (Brower, J., sep. opinion), reprinted in Iranian
Assets Litig. Rep. 12,403 (June 13, 1986). These cases were among those distributed
to the three Chambers as representative of issues involved in wrongful expulsion
cases. See id.; Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at
15 n.10 (Brower, J., dissenting) (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib.July 14, 1987) (WESTLAW,
INT-IRAN database). Unfortunately, the test case procedure has not been followed.
Hernandez, Case No. 11762, slip. op. at 3, reprinted in Iranian Assets Litig. Rep. at
12,404. Subsequent to the adoption of the test case plan, the Tribunal selected cases
"virtually without regard" to that plan. Id. Moreover, a body of precedent may not
expedite the resolution of the pending small claims cases because Iran may be unwilling to agree to a lump-sum settlement. Prywes, The "Small" Iran Claims: Present Status
and Future Prospects, 10 MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP. 9, 20 (1987); see also Stewart &

Sherman, supra note 6, at 13-14 (discussing the test case approach and lump-sum
settlement of small claims).
26. See Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 14; Rankin, Award No. 32610913-2, slip. op. at 24 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Nov. 3, 1987) (WESTLAW, INTIRAN database).
27. Award No. 324-10199-1, slip. op. at 21 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Nov. 2, 1987)
(WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database).
28. Id. at 23, 26-29.
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and argued that U.S. nationals were constructively expelled by
the circumstances created by the revolutionary movement in
the implementation of a policy promulgated by the Ayatollah
and designed to effect the departure of U.S. nationals."9
A. Short: Actions Not Attributable to the State
In Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran,3" Chamber Three of the
Tribunal refused to find that the claimant was wrongfully expelled because he did not establish that his departure was
caused by wrongful conduct attributable to Iran.3 '
Alfred Short began employment with Lockheed Aircraft
32
Service Company in April 1977 under a two-year contract.
Short claimed that after the onset of the Islamic Revolution in
late 1978 he lived under increasing stress caused by anti-American threats and violence that were instigated by statements of
the Ayatollah Khomeini.33 Following the departure of the
Shah inJanuary 1979, attacks on U.S. nationals and anti-American sentiment escalated. 4 Although Short accepted an extension of his employment in Iran onJanuary 22, 1979, he alleged
that the tumultuous situation after the return of the Ayatollah
forced his departure in February 1979." 5
The Tribunal held that the actions that caused Short's departure could not be attributed to the Islamic Republic because there was no state action. 36 The Tribunal accepted in
principle that an alien can be wrongfully expelled "in the absence of any order or specific state action. '3 7 It added, however,
that an alien must then prove that he had "no other choice
than to leave," and that the acts leading to his departure "were
attributable to the State."3 8 The Tribunal agreed that a state
would be responsible for the actions imputable to the revolu29. Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 2 (Brower, J., dissenting).
30. Award No. 312-11135-3 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. July 14, 1987) (WESTLAW,
INT-IRAN database). Short sought reparation for lost employment income and benefits and abandoned personal property. Id. at 2.
31. Id.at 14.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id. at 6.
34. Id. at 7.
35. Id.at 7-8.
36. Id.at 13-14.
37. Id. at II (emphasis added).
38. Id.
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tionary movement that established the state, but it held that
Short had failed to impute the cause of his departure to the
Islamic Republic. 39 The Tribunal found that Short did not
"identify any agent of the revolutionary movement, the actions
of which compelled him to leave Iran." 4 ° Moreover, the Tribunal was not persuaded that the general statements of the
Ayatollah caused anti-American actions by revolutionaries or
even that any action by revolutionaries caused Short's departure.4
B. Judge Brower's Dissent in Short: Constructive Expulsion
In his dissent from the Tribunal's decision, Judge Brower
argued that expulsion can occur constructively in the absence
of a specific state actor or action when the state engages "in
discrete acts or omissions collectively designed to bring about

[an alien's] departure. "42
Judge Brower found that the statements of Ayatollah
Khomeini were part of a studied policy, implemented by his
followers, that was designed to expel all U.S. nationals from
Iran." According to Judge Brower, the Ayatollah's statements
clearly reveal that he believed that "to rid Iran of the Shah for
certain one had also to cleanse it completely of Americans and
their influence in every form."4 4 Judge Brower further found a
direct correlation between the Ayatollah's verbal attacks on the
United States and anti-American violence in Iran.4 5 In other
words, the Ayatollah's supporters decided as a matter of policy
to expel U.S. nationals.4 6
Judge Brower argued that the anti-American actions of the
39. Id. at 12-13.
40. Id.at 13.
41. Id. at 14.
42. Id. at 2 (Brower, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 13. Judge Brower stated that the general declarations of the Ayatollah
can "be seen to have caused the more general, less cataclysmic and rather complete
exodus of Americans from Iran." Id. at 12-13 n.8.
44. Id. at 6.
45. Id. at 11. "The fact that virtually every last American had given it all up in
Iran by (or soon after) the end of February 1979 strongly suggests that something
more than general revolutionary disorder was at play." Id. at 15. Judge Brower did
not suggest that all U.S. citizens left Iran because of the Ayatollah's anti-American
policy. However, he found that this policy was the cause of some departures. Id. at
13-16.
46. Id. at 16.
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supporters of the Ayatollah were attributable to the Islamic
Republic.47 He stated that the fact that the revolutionary
movement was not in a conventional military form did not negate the accepted principle that the acts of a successful revolutionary movement are attributable to the new government.4 "
Indeed, Judge Brower argued, a successful movement of
loosely organized adherents is no less responsible for its actions than a conventional military unit.49
Moreover, Judge Brower contended that the "determinedly anti-American stance" of the revolutionary movement
caused the expulsion of some U.S. nationals. 50 He found no
basis for Iran's assertion that U.S. nationals were ordered out
by the U.S. government. 5 1 Judge Brower reasoned that the
fact that all but 5000 of the 45,000 U.S. nationals who had
lived in Iran prior to 1978 had left Iran by February 1979 and
the fact that only 1500 U.S. nationals have since brought
wrongful expulsion claims indicated that the Revolution had
caused the departure of at least that small percentage. 2
Judge Brower concluded that the Tribunal should establish a rebuttable presumption 53 that the. departure of any U.S.
national after the return of the Ayatollah to Iran on February 1
was "very likely due to the applied anti-Americanism of the
Ayatollah and his followers." ' 54 Thus, the Islamic Republic

would be responsible for55the wrongful expulsion of U.S. nationals from the country.
47. Id. at 19. "It would be emphasizing form over substance, and failing to
adapt the traditional concepts of international law to evolving political developments,
to say that acts of unorganized or loosely organized adherents of the successful
Revolution are not attributable to the ensuing government." Id.
48. Id. at 18-19.
49. Id. at 19.
50. Id. at 15.
51. Id. at 14 n.9.
52. Id. at 15. Judge Brower further found that the circumstances underlying the
1500 claims filed indicate that the Islamic Revolution caused the departure of U.S.
nationals. Id. at 15-16. Of the 1500 claims filed, over half of them appeared to arise
in February 1979. Id. Moreover, many of the claims after February 1 involved mistreatment of U.S. nationals by Revolutionary Guards. Id. at 16.
53. Id. at 22.
54. Id. at 21.
55. Id. at 21-22.
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C. Rankin. State's Actions Did Not Cause the Departureof U.S.
Nationals
In Rankin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,5 6 Chamber Two of the
Tribunal found that this claimant had also failed to prove that
his departure was caused by actions attributable to the Islamic
Republic." The Tribunal focused on whether or not Rankin
intended to leave Iran voluntarily.5 8 It found that the "generally chaotic conditions" during the Revolution were the motivation for his departure and could not be attributed to the new
59
government.
Rankin was under contract with Bell Helicopter International, Inc. ("BHI"), through February 1980.60 Nevertheless,
on February 12, 1979, Rankin and his wife went to the Teheran
Hilton Hotel, where terminated BHI employees had gathered
to prepare for departure. 6 '
Shortly after the Rankins' arrival, members of an armed
group gained control of the hotel.62 They took senior BHI
representatives to the revolutionary headquarters of the
Ayatollah Khomeini, where the representatives claim they met
with Dr. Yazdi, a leading figure in the revolutionary movement. 63 Dr. Yazdi allegedly told the BHI representatives that
the new government wanted nothing to do with U.S. nationals
and that all BHI employees would have to leave Iran.6 4 After
five days of confinement, the Rankins and fellow employees
were taken to the airport and they then left the country.6 5
The Tribunal held that Rankin failed to prove that he did
not intend to leave Iran when he went to the Hilton on February 12.66 Thus, he failed to prove that the Ayatollah's policy of
56. Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Nov. 3, 1987)
(WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database). Rankin sought compensation from Iran for loss
of personal property and property rights arising from his alleged wrongful expulsion.
Id. at 2.
57. Id. at 24.
58. Id. at 20-23.
59. Id. at 23-24.
60. Id. at 3.
61. Id. at 3-4.
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 23.
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ridding the country of foreigners, as evidenced by Dr. Yazdi's
a substantial causal factor in his departure
statement, "was
67
from Iran."

The Tribunal stated that it would find Iran liable only if
Rankin could prove two facts: one, that he was compelled to
leave by wrongful acts attributable to the Islamic Republic; and
two, that such wrongful expulsion caused losses to his property
or property interests. 68 The Tribunal reasoned that an action
is wrongful if it is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in breach of the
expelling State's treaty obligations. "69 Even in the absence of
an order that directs an individual to leave, expulsion is wrongful if the action creates a situation in which an individual's
"continued presence in the host country is made impossible
because of conditions70generated by wrongful acts of the State
or attributable to it."

The Tribunal found that the statements of the Ayatollah
were attributable to the Islamic Republic. 7 Furthermore, it
stated that the Ayatollah's policy of ridding the country of foreigners, particularly U.S. nationals, could violate the obligations of the Treaty of Amity7 2 between the United States and
67. Id.
68. Id. at 10.
69. Id.at 11.
70. Id.
71. Id.at 17.
72. Id.at 17-18. The provisions of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations,
and Consular Rights Between the United States of America and Iran, Aug. 15, 1955,
8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, 284 U.N.T.S. 93 (entered into force June 16, 1957)
[hereinafter Treaty of Amity] are applicable to the cases before the Tribunal. See, e.g.,
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3, 28 (although the operation of the Treaty has been impaired by the
rupture of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran, "its provisions remain
part of the corpus of law applicable between the U.S. and Iran"); Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., Award No. ITL 59-129-3, slip. op. at 3 (Brower, J., sep. opinion) (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Mar. 27, 1986), reprinted in Iranian Assets Litig. Rep.
12,103, 12,104 (Apr. 11, 1986) (the Treaty of Amity has not been terminated because
Iran has not given notice of termination under either the provisions of the Treaty or
general principles of international law); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, Award No. 217-99-2, slip. op. at 15-16 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Mar. 19, 1986),
reprinted in Iranian Assets Litig. Rep. 12,044, 12,051 (Mar. 28, 1986) (the Tribunal
did not find it necessary to determine whether the Treaty remained in force at the
hearing date as it was clearly applicable at the time the claim arose); see also Clark v.
Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508-514 (1947) (discussing governmental actions that may suspend or abrogate all or part of a treaty); Chariton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 475 (1913)
(although the other nation has violated a treaty with the United States, it remains in
force until the United States elects to declare its abrogation).
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Iran.7 3 The Tribunal held, however, that Rankin did not prove
that the Ayatollah's statements caused his departure because
he failed to prove that he did not intend to leave Iran voluntarily.7 4 Therefore, his departure was not caused by actions of
the state.7 5
D. Yeager: The Introduction of Revolutionary Guards
In Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran,7 6 Chamber One of the
Tribunal found that the claimant had been wrongfully expelled
but held that only some of his alleged injuries were a result of
his expulsion." The additional element that sparked liability
7
in this case was the specific action of Revolutionary Guards, 1
whom the Tribunal found to have caused Yeager's departure
from Iran.79 The Tribunal, however, did not hold Iran responthose that were a direct result of
sible for any losses 8beyond
0
actions.
the Guards'
Yeager began employment in Iran in January 1978 with
BHI under a two-year contract. 8 ' He alleged that, beginning
in October 1978, U.S. nationals were subject to threats and intimidation instigated and supported by the Ayatollah, and that
such intimidation eventually caused the de facto expulsion of
U.S. nationals.8 2 Yeager contended that he was harassed by his
73. Rankin, Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. at 18. The Treaty of Amity provides in relevant part that Iran can expel U.S. citizens only as "necessary to maintain
public order, and to protect public health, morals and safety." Treaty of Amity, supra
note 72, art. 11(3), 8 U.S.T. at 902, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, at 2, 284 U.N.T.S. at 112.
74. Rankin, Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. at 23.
75. Id. at 23-24.
76. Award No. 324-10199-1 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Nov. 2, 1987) (WESTLAW,
INT-IRAN database). Yeager sought compensation for damages in the amount of
US$134,147.14 for his alleged wrongful expulsion. Id.at 2.
77. Id. at 30-31.
78. The term "Revolutionary Guards" has been used to describe groups loyal to
the Ayatollah since February 1979. Id. at 16. These groups were also referred to as
"Komitehs," which were neighborhood revolutionary committees that formed during
the early stages of the Revolution. Id. at 15. In May 1979, Komitehs were recognized
by an official decree under the name Revolutionary Guard. Id. at 16. The Tribunal
found that the terms "Revolutionary Komitehs" and "Revolutionary Guards" were
used to describe the same group of revolutionaries. Id. The Tribunal stated that, at
some point from February to May 1979, they had apparently changed their name but
not their composition. Id.
79. Id. at 14.
80. Id. at 22-29.
81. Id. at 3.
82. Id.
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neighbors, who stated that "trouble would come" to him and
his wife.8 3 On February 13, 1979, two men, identified as Revolutionary Guards by distinctive arm bands indicating association with the new government, came to his apartment armed
with rifles. 84 They announced that he and his wife would have
to leave within thirty minutes.8 5 The Guards then took them to
the Hilton Hotel, where they were forced to stay until they left
Iran on February 17.86 Yeager and his wife were searched at
the airport by Guards, who seized their cash.87
The Tribunal held that Yeager had been wrongfully expelled by Revolutionary Guards who were acting on behalf of
the new government.88 It stated that an act can be attributed
to a state if the claimant can identify "with reasonable certainty
the actors and their association with the State." '8 9 Although

the Tribunal recognized that the ongoing turmoil in Iran made
such identification difficult, it concluded "that there were identifiable groups associated with the new government that ...
acted for Iran immediately after the victory of the Revolution." 90 Expulsion by such groups constituted wrongful state
action. 9 1

The Tribunal then found that the actions of the Revolutionary Guards were attributable to the government because,
at least after February 11, 1979, the Guards were acting for the
new government, or "exercised elements of governmental authority in the absence of official authorities, in operations of
which the new Government must have had knowledge and to
which it did not specifically object." '92 Thus, because the government did not establish that it could not control the Guards'
actions, the Tribunal held it responsible for those actions. 93 In
contrast, the Tribunal did not find a sufficient causal link be83. Id. at 4.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 4-5.
86. Id. at 5.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 18-19, 21.
89. Id. at 15.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 15-17.
92. Id. at 18. The Tribunal also found evidence to suggest that the new government supported the Guards' actions. Id. at 19.
93. Id. at 19-21.
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tween the statements of Yeager's neighbors and the sale of his
property at below its value.9 4
The Tribunal further found that the Guards' actions
caused Yeager's departure. 9 5 Although BI-II had started to
evacuate its personnel in late 1978, its employees were not obligated to leave Iran.9 6 Nor were they bound by U.S. Embassy
recommendations to leave.9 7 Therefore, the Tribunal reasoned that the Guards had forced Yeager to leave Iran and that
this conduct constituted a "dejure expulsion by virtue of an express or implied order."9' 8 Moreover, the Tribunal considered
the expulsion wrongful because it violated the Treaty of Amity
and because it did not give Yeager "sufficient time to wind up
his affairs," as required by accepted principles of international
law. 9 9
Accordingly, the Tribunal held the Islamic Republic of
Iran responsible for all of the losses that were a direct result of
Yeager's wrongful expulsion.' 0 0 Those losses included the
value of the property Yeager was forced to leave behind '0 and
the cash seized at the airport.' 0 2 Because it did not attribute
the statements of Yeager's neighbors to the Islamic Republic,
the Tribunal denied compensation for losses allegedly sustained as a result of those statements.'
The Tribunal further
found that Yeager's employment contract was terminated because BHI ceased operations in Iran. °4 Thus, the Tribunal
denied Yeager's claim for compensation for loss of salary and
0 5
employment benefits.
II. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS
Under general principles of international law, an alien
claimant seeking to hold a state responsible for certain conduct
94. Id. at 23.
95. Id. at 21.
96. Id. at 19-20.
97. Id. at 20.
98. Id. at 21.
99. Id. at 21-22.
100. Id. at 23, 27.
101. Id. at 23.
102. Id. at 27.
103. Id. at 23.
104. Id. at 26.
105. Id.
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must prove three facts: that the conduct was unlawful, that10 6it
was attributable to the state, and that it resulted in injury.
A. Unlawful Conduct
A state has the right to expel aliens as an incident of its
sovereignty.'0 7 That right, however, must not be exercised in
106. Dickson Car Wheel Co. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l
Arb. Awards 669, 678 (1931); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 711 (1987) (a state is responsible for injuries

sustained by foreign nationals as a result of an official act or omission in violation of
international law); B. CHENG, GENERAL' PRINCIPLES OF LAW 170 (1987) ("International responsibility is immediately incurred by a State which, by an act imputable to
it, has violated a rule of international law."); Christenson, The Doctrine of Attribution in
State Responsibility, in R.

LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR

321, 324 (1983) (a state is responsible when acts or omissions
attributed to it breach an international obligation).
Unlawful conduct may result from a breach of an international obligation under
either a treaty stipulation or general principles of international law. B. CHENG, supra,
at 173. Such a breach can occur through either an act or an omission. Id. at 174; see
C.F. AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 43 (1967) (the issue is whether a breach of international law has arisen from either acts or omissions
INJURIES TO ALIENS

of the state); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 206 comment e (1987) (a state is responsible when it breaches its
duties under either international law or international agreement); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 337 (8th ed. 1955) (an international delinquency results from

every breach of an international legal duty).
An "omission" in breach of an international obligation occurs when a state fails
to act when it has a duty to do so. B. CHENG, supra, at 174. Such a breach occurs
when, for example, a state fails to prosecute one of its citizens who has committed a
crime against a foreigner. See, e.g., Chevreau Case (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), 2 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 1113, 1123 (1927) (Great Britain breached its international obligations when
it failed to make a proper investigation after an otherwise lawful arrest of a French
citizen); Stephens v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 265,
268 (1927) (when a U.S. national was shot by a Mexican soldier, the Mexican Government was held responsible for both the act of the soldier and for failing to prosecute
an official who allowed the soldier to escape).
Additionally, it is essential that the unlawful act or omission caused injury to the
foreign national. C.F. AMERASINGHE, supra, at 55 (1967); see Straus, Causation as an
Element of State Responsibility, 16 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 893, 923-25 (1984) (discussing principles that should be applied in determining whether state actions caused
injuries to foreign nationals).
107. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (the right to
expel aliens is "an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign"); Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (every nation has, as an incident of its
sovereignty, the right to forbid the entrance of foreigners to its territory or to admit
them only on certain conditions); accordBoffolo Case (Italy v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 528, 534 (c. 1903) ("[a] state possesses the general right of expulsion"); Maal
Case (Netherlands v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 730, 731 (c.1903) (the right to
expel foreigners is an attribute of the state's sovereignty); Paquet Case (Belg. v.
Venez.), 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 323, 325 (c.1903) (the right to expel foreigners dan-
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an arbitrary manner.'0 8 An expulsion must be exercised in
good faith and must be justified, generally, as being in the public interest of the state.' 0 9 Thus, Venezuela was held responsible for damages sustained by an Italian citizen who was expelled because he published newspaper articles that were critical of the Venezuelan government." t0 The umpire of the
Italian-Venezuelan Commission found that freedom of speech
gerous to the public order is generally recognized); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206 (1987) ("Under international law, a state has ... sovereignty over its territory."); E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 48 (1915) ("[t]he power to expel aliens rests
upon ... the sovereignty of the state"); B. CHENG, supra note 106, at 32 (a state has
the right to expel aliens in the interests of its welfare and security); G. GOODWINGILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT

OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 203

(1978) (a state has the competence to expel aliens as an incident of its sovereignty);
L. OPPENHEIM,

supra note 106, at 691 (a state's right to expel aliens is generally rec-

ognized); M. PELLONPXA, EXPULSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1984) (a state's right
to expel aliens is based upon its sovereignty).
Expulsion is an action by the state that secures the removal of an alien from the
state either forcibly or under threat of forcible removal. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra, at
201; M. PELLONPA.A, supra, at 4. It is commonly effected through an order or proclamation of a state official. See E. BORCHARD, supra, at 54 ("In many countries expulsion
is carried out by administrative order of the minister of interior or other executive
officer."); see also 4 J. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 3333-59 (1898) (discussing
cases wherein individuals claimed damages for expulsions ordered by a state).
108. E. BORCHARD, supra note 107, at 49, 51 (the right of expulsion is limited by
a state's obligations under international law and cannot be exercised arbitrarily); B.
CHENG, supra note 106, at 36 (the discretionary right of expulsion must not be exercised arbitrarily); L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 106, at 692 ("Although a State may exercise its right of expulsion according to discretion, it must not abuse its right by proceeding in an arbitrary manner."); see Chevreau Case, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1123
(the arbitrary arrest, detention, or deportation of a foreigner may give rise to a claim
under international law) (author's translation). Expulsion has been described as an
exercise of controlled discretion by the state. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 107, at
204.

109. Maal Case, 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 731 (the power of expulsion is rightfully exercised only in proper defense of the country from anticipated or actual danger); Paquet Case, 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 325 (the state has the right to expel a
foreigner only if the state considers him to be dangerous to the public order); E.
BORCHARD, supra note 107, at 51 (a general justification for an expulsion "may be
summed up in the words 'the public interests of the state' "); B. CHENG, supra note
106, at 36 (a state has the right to expel aliens as a measure of self-protection but it
must be exercised in good faith); G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 107, at 203 (the
power of expulsion is frequently justified as in the public interests of the state).
Whether an expulsion has been rightfully exercised must be determined in light of
the state's international obligations. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 107, at 21.
110. Boffolo Case, 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 537. One article was critical of the
judiciary and the president of Venezuela, and another encouraged the reading of a
socialist paper. Id. at 536-37.

1988]

WRONGFUL EXPULSION

and press were guaranteed by the Venzuelan Constitution, and
thus the expulsion could not be justified as being in the public
interest of the state." '
When an expulsion is in bad faith or clearly unreasonable
it is also an unlawful abuse of a state's discretion." 12 Thus, a
state is considered responsible for damages resulting from an
expulsion based on personal enmities' ' 3 or used as a means of
expropriation." 4 The same is true of an expulsion used as a
15
method of racial discrimination
or as a reprisal against the
6
expellee's state.1

These principles may also be applicable to expulsions of
aliens en masse."l 7 For example, in 1972 President Idi Amin
11. Id. at 537.
112. B. CHENG, supra note 106, at 134; see Concerning Rights of Nationals of the
United States in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.CJ. 176, 212 (preliminary objection)
(when Morocco instituted import controls that discriminated against the United
States, it was held that Morocco had the power to regulate its imports but that that
power had to be exercised "reasonably and in good faith").
113. J. MOORE, supra note 107, at 3333-34 (Case of Santangelo).
114. G. GOODWIN-GIu., supra note 107, at 212-13.
115. E. BORCHARD, supra note 107, at 61; see also Sharma & Wooldridge, Some
Legal Questions Arising from the Expulsion of Ugandan Asians, 23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 397,
405 (1974) (suggesting that the collective expulsion of British subjects of Asian descent was unlawful because it was in breach of the law of the United Nations regarding racial discrimination).
116. Portugal v. Germany (The Naulilaa Case), 4 Ann. Dig. 526, 527 (Special
Arb. Trib. 1928). Germany was held responsible for destroying outposts in Portuguese Territory as a means of reprisal against Portugal after Portuguese officers accidentally shot German officers. Id. at 526-27. The tribunal held that a right of reprisal is legitimately exercised only when: (1) there is a violation of international law by
the state against which the reprisal is directed and (2) the reprisal is preceded by a
request to remedy the alleged violation. Id. at 527. The tribunal in this case found
that Portugal had not violated international law because the deaths were accidental
and that Germany had not preceded its action with a request for reparation. Id. The
tribunal also stated that a reprisal that is disproportionate to the act that prompted it
is "excessive and therefore illegal." Id.; see also Arbitrage Entre le Portugal et
l'Allemagne (Port. v. Germ.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1035, 1057 (1930) (reprisals are
not permissible except against the provoking state) (author's translation); cf. B.
CHENG, supra note 106, at 97-99 (discussing reprisals as a measure of self-help against
prior unlawful acts by another state).
117. There is a prohibition against collective expulsions expressed in article 7 of
the Draft Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Citizens of
the Country in Which They Live, reprinted in D. ELLES, 'INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONS
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENs 54, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
392/Rev.I (1980); see also Sharma & Wooldridge, supra note 115, at 404-05 (discussing why then-President Idi Amin's actions could be unlawful).
It was also argued that an order by Indonesia for the mass expulsion of Netherlands citizens could be a fortiori an unlawful international act. G. SCHWAR-
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of Uganda ordered the expulsion of all British subjects of
Asian descent because they were allegedly "sabotaging the
economy." ' " 8 It seems clear that Amin's action violated general principles of international law. Amin's allegations that
British Asians were "sabotaging the economy" were never substantiated.1 9 Furthermore, it has been suggested that the expulsion was unlawful because many expellees were subject to

unjustifiable harassment and because the measure
was purely a
20
discrimination.
racial
of
method
disguised
A state must provide legitimate reasons for an expulsion
to the expellee's state.' 2' When a state refuses to provide such
275 (1971). The order was allegedly a
reprisal against the Netherlands. Id. It was argued that ordering the expulsion of
aliens en masse as a reprisal would be in violation of" 'general principles of good
neighbourliness' " required by article 74 of the Charter of the United Nations. Id. at
276. It was also argued that such a measure would be in violation of article 2 of the
Charter, which requires members of the United Nations to settle their international
disputes by peaceful means. Id. Thus, Indonesia should have exhausted the peaceful
means available for the resolution of her dispute with the Netherlands. Id. Indonesia
did bring a resolution in the General Assembly of the United Nations but it failed to
carry. Id. It could have attempted, however, to settle the dispute before the World
Court. Id.
118. Sharma & Wooldridge, supra note 115, at 405. Great Britain initially requested that the United Nations General Assembly address this issue. Id. at 403. It
withdrew its request, however, after Uganda indicated a willingness to discuss an
extension of its deadline for the departure of British nationals. G. GOODWIN-GILL,
supra note 107, at 214. Thereafter Uganda refused to extend the deadline and repeatedly refused to enter into negotiations regarding compensation to the expellees
for expropriated property. Id. at 214 n.2; Sharma & Wooldridge, supra note 115, at
403-04. Once out of Uganda, the victims had no local remedies and no other legal
means of securing a review of the measure. Sharma & Wooldridge, supra note 115, at
406.
119. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 107, at 215; Sharma & Wooldridge, supra
note 115, at 410. Moreover, the expulsion probably could not have been substantiated because it is "impossible to believe that all the British Asians in Uganda were
sabotaging the economy." M. PELLONPAA, supra note 107, at 70 (emphasis in original). The action was also challenged as unlawful because the expellees were not allowed to have their cases reviewed, and they were not granted adequate time to arrange their affairs. Sharma & Wooldridge, supra note 115, at 405.
120. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 107, at 215.
121. Boffolo Case (Italy v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 528, 534 (c. 1903); see
also E. BORCHARD, supra note 107, at 51, 56 (a government must, on demand, provide
evidence that an expulsion was based on a legitimate fear that the public interests of
the state were in danger); G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 107, at 208 (a state's exercise
of its right to expel aliens is subject to the requirement of justification); L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 106, at 693 (discussing the legitimate reasons for an expulsion).
The expelling state must provide explanations to the expellee's state because an
individual who is injured by a foreign state must ordinarily rely upon his sovereign to
ZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER

1988]

WRONGFUL EXPULSION

819

reasons for an expulsion, the action can be held to be arbitrary
and the state can be held responsible for any resulting injuries.1 22 For example, Venezuela was held responsible for the
direct damages sustained by a Belgian national as a result of
his expulsion when Venezuela refused to explain the reasons
for the expulsion. 2 The Belgian-Venezuelan Commission
stated that "when such explanations are refused... the expulsion can be considered as an arbitrary act of such a nature as to

entail reparation."

124

An expulsion is also unlawful if it is in violation of a state's
treaty obligations. 25 Thus, Mexico was held responsible for
present a claim against that state. C.F.

AMERASINGHE, supra

note 106, at 172; see L.

& T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 19 (1973)
(only the entity to which an international obligation is owed can bring a claim for
breach of that obligation); Christenson, supra note 106, at 329.(when a state's nationals are injured abroad in violation of international law, the state itself seeks reparation). An individual must first, however, exhaust the remedies available within the
state in which he was injured before he can seek reparation in an international tribunal. C.F. AMERASINGHE, supra note 106, at 169; see also Finnish Vessels Case (Fin. v.
Gr. Brit.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1479, 1501 (1934) (the function of the local remedies rule is to permit the state to discharge responsibility in its own tribunals). An
individual need not pursue those remedies that would be ineffective. C.F. AMERASINGHE, supra note 106, at 240. He must pursue only those that would ensure an
impartial determination of his dispute. d. at 191. In some cases, this requirement
may be waived by treaties between states that provide for resolution of claims in
international tribunals. See B. CHENG, supra note 106, at 179 n.65 (listing claims conventions in which the local remedies rule has been eliminated); Jones, supra note 24,
at 277 (with respect to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, "the traditional
framework of State responsibility claims appears to have been modified in that the
requirement of exhaustion of local remedies has been waived").
122. Boffolo Case, 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 537; see also Paquet Case (BeIg. v.
Venez.), 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 323, 325 (c.1903) (when a state refuses to provide
explanations to the expellee's government, the expulsion may be considered an arbitrary act and the expellee entitled to reparation); E. BORCHARD, supra note 107, at 57
("An expulsion without cause or based on insufficient evidence has been held to afford a good title to indemnity."); cf. In re Hochbaum, 7 Ann. Dig. 325, 326-27 (Upper
Silesian Arb. Trib. 1934) (when a state sets forth reasons for an expulsion that are
supported by facts stated in sufficient detail, the reasonableness of the conclusion
that the expellee was dangerous to the public interests of the state is not subject to
review); B. CHENG, supra note 106, at 133 ("In cases concerning the expulsion of
aliens, an international tribunal would normally accept as conclusive the reasons of a
serious nature adduced by the state as justifying such action.").
SOHN

123. Paquet Case, 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 325. Paquet's expulsion occurred

when Venezuelan authorities refused to allow him to disembark at one of its ports
when he returned to the country. Id. at 324.
124. Id. at 325. Apparently, if a state refuses to justify an expulsion, it is presumed to have no rational basis for the action.
125. C.F. AMERASINGHE, supra note 106, at 40; see, e.g., Phosphates in Morocco,
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damages sustained by U.S. merchants when they were expelled
on short notice in violation of a treaty that allowed the
2 6
merchants at least six months to settle their affairs.1
Moreover, an otherwise lawful expulsion may give rise to
liability if it is carried out in a manner that is unnecessarily detrimental to the expellee. 2 7 Consequently, a state may be held
responsible if an expulsion is executed with undue haste 28 or
the expellee is subjected to unnecessary hardship. 29 For example, Venezuela was required to compensate a Dutch citizen
for the indignities he suffered when he was publicly stripped of
all of his clothing, searched, and then expelled from the country.' 30 The umpire of the Netherlands-Venezuelan Commission stated that he would have disallowed the claim if the
claimant had been expelled without "unnecessary indignity." 13 1 In this case, however, the umpire found no possible
32
reason for a public or private strip-search of the claimant.
B. Attribution
Once a claimant establishes unlawful conduct, he must
1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 74, at 28 (if an act that is attributable to a state is con-

trary to the treaty rights of another state, international responsibility is established
between the two states).
126. J. MOORE, supra note 107, at 3334-35, 3344.
127. E. BORCHARD, supra note 107, at 60 (an expulsion should be carried out
with as little injury to the individual and his property interests as possible); see also M.
PELLONPXA, supra note 107, at 419 (an expulsion should not be carried out in a humiliating manner because its purpose is not to humiliate the expellee but to protect the
state from damages resulting from the expellee's continued residence in the state).
128. M. PELLONPXA, supra note 107, at 420 (traditionally, aliens must be afforded
sufficient time to "wind up their affairs").
129. E. BORCHARD, supra note 107, at 59 (any "unnecessary harshness" occuring
during an expulsion is grounds for a claim by the expellee against the expelling
state); P. JEssup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 82 (1968) (the manner of expulsion

must be one that avoids undue hardship); see Chevreau Case (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), 2 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards 1113, 1123 (1931) (the detainee must be treated in a manner appropriate to his situation, and if this rule is not observed, a claim may be justified)
(author's translation); Boffolo Case (Italy v. Venez.) 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 528, 534
(c. 1903) (expulsion must be effected "inthe manner least injurious to the expellee");
Maal Case (Neth. v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 730, 732-33 (c.1903) (holding
Venezuela responsible for an expulsion that subjected the expellee to unnecessary
indignity).
130. Maal Case, 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 732-33.
131. Id. at 732.
132. Id.
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prove that the conduct is attributable to the state.' 3 3 It has
long been recognized that the actions of a successful revolutionary movement are attributable to the resulting state because the leaders of the movement become those of the
state. 134 In fact, whether the actions of revolutionaries are attributable to the state "depends entirely upon [the revolution's] ultimate success." 13 5 If the revolutionary movement
does not succeed, those involved in the insurgency cannot be
considered agents of the state.' 36 Consequently, a state is not
held responsible for the actions of unsuccessful revolution37
aries. 1
133. C.
(1968).

DEVISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

289

134. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, [1975] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 47, 99-

102, U.N. Doc. A/10010/REV.I [hereinafter 1975 Draft Articles]; see Williams v.
Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 186 (1877) (the state is responsible for the actions of successful
revolutionaries); Bolivar Ry. Co. Case (Gr. Brit. v. Venez.), 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
445, 452-53 (c. 1903) (the government is responsible for the actions of successful
revolutionaries because they represent the same nation); French Co. of Venezuela
R.Rs. (Fr. v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 285, 354 (1903) ("since the revolution
was successful, the . . . Government is properly chargeable" with the damages it
caused); Pomeroy's El Paso (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 551, 563 (1930)
("[i]nternational tribunals have repeatedly held a government responsible for acts of
successful revolutionists"); Russel (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 805, 831
(1931) ("a government is responsible for the acts of successful revolutionists"); Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 30, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add. 1 ("The act of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new government of a State shall be considered as an act of that State.");
C.F. AMERASINGHE, supra note 106, at 54 (the acts or omissions of successful revolutionaries are attributable to the state from the beginning of the revolution); E.
BORCHARD, supra note 107, at 241-42 (the government created through the efforts of
successful revolutionaries is liable for their actions from the inception of the revolution); see also Dix Case (U.S. v. Venez.), 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 119, 120 (c.1903) (the
actions of a successful revolutionary movement are to be treated as those of a de
facto government and if those actions include the taking of property then the owner
has a right to demand compensation from the movement); Kummerow Case (Germ.
v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 369, 371 (c.1903) (the state is responsible for the
actions of revolutionaries if they can be considered the government de facto because
of the means at their command); Puerto Cabello, Etc. Ry. (Gr. Brit. v. Venez.), 9 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards 510, 513 (c.1903) (the claims might have been allowed if the injuries had been inflicted by successful revolutionaries).
135. Williams, 96 U.S. at 186.
136. Id. at 186 (if the revolution perishes all of its acts perish with it); accord
Sambiaggio Case (Italy v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 499, 513 (c. 1903) (unsuccessful revolutionaries cannot be considered agents of the government).
137. Guastini Case (Italy v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 561, 578 (c.1903)
(the state is not legally responsible for the actions of unsuccessful revolutionaries);
1975 DraftArticles, supra note 134, at 100 ("acts of insurgents are not considered to be
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Generally, a state is also not responsible for the actions of
mobs that do not mature into successful revolutions if the
mob's actions are beyond the control of the state. 138 The state
is responsible, however, if it failed to exercise due diligence to
suppress mob violence,' 3 9 or instigated the mob's actions.' 4 °
For example, Panama was held responsible when a U.S. soldier
acts of the state when the final outcome of the civil war is unfavourable to them"); see
also British Property in Spanish Morocco (Spain v. Gr. Brit.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
615, 642 (1925) (the state is not responsible for damages caused by popular riots,
revolts, and wars) (author's translation); Aroa Mines (Ltd.) (Gr. Brit. v. Venez.), 9 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards 402, 439 (c. 1903) (the state is not responsible for injuries to aliens
caused by the actions of private persons that it is temporarily unable to control);
Kummerow Case (Germ. v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 369, 379 (c.1903) (the
"rule" is that the state is not liable for the actions of individuals outside the scope of
its authority); Padr6n Case (Spain v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 741, 743
(c. 1903) (the state is not responsible for damages incurred by foreigners as a result of
the actions of persons in revolt against the constituted government); Puerto Cabello, 9
R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 513 (the Venezuelan Government was not held responsible
for property destroyed by unsuccessful insurgents); Sambiaggio Case (Italy v.
Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 499, 507 (c. 1903) (if revolutionaries have escaped
the government's control, the state cannot be held responsible).
138. See sources cited supra note 137.
139. British Property in Spanish Morocco, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 642. It is accepted that a state has a duty to extend a certain degree of protection to aliens that it
has admitted to its territory. Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 1, 32 (Judgment of Feb. 5, 1970). When a state neglects to extend
this protection, it may be held responsible for the injuries that result. Id. at 32-33; see
also United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1887) ("[t]he law of nations requires
every national government to use 'due diligence' to prevent a wrong being done
within its own dominion to another nation ...or to the people thereof"); British
Property in Spanish Morocco, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 642 (the state is held to a certain
vigilance) (author's translation); E. BORCHARD, supra note 107, at 220-21, 223-24 (the
state is not responsible when foreigners are injured as a result of mob violence, unless it failed to exercise due diligence to prevent the violence); L. OPPENHEIM, supra
note 106, at 366 (a state will be responsible only if it could have prevented a riot by
exercising due diligence); cf. Home Missionary Soc'y Case, 1 Ann. Dig. 173, 174
(British-Am. Claims Arb. Trib. 1920) (the British Government was not responsible
for the murder of missionaries and destruction of missions in Sierra Leone because
there was no evidence that it "had failed in its duty to afford adequate protection for
life and property"); Kummerow Case, 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 371 (the state is not
liable for the actions of persons outside the scope of its authority unless it was negligent in providing timely protection); Trochel v. State of Tunisia, 20 I.L.R. 47, 48
(Tunisia Trib. Civ. of Tunis 1953) (Tunisia was not responsible for injuries sustained
by a foreigner during a series of riots because the authorities were not derelict in
their duty to maintain law and order).
140. See, e.g., Guastini Case, 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 566-67 (Venezuela was
held responsible for failing to exercise due diligence to protect foreigners because it
did not use the means at its disposal to control an insurrection but instead encouraged the damages charged); see also Lestoque v. Reich, 28 I.L.R. 189, 191 (Federal Republic of Ger. Sup. Restitution Ct. 2d Div. 1959) (the Reich was not responsi-
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was shot during a mob uprising because the police failed to
maintain order and "aggravated the situation by firing on the
soldiers instead of dispersing the civilians."''
Even if a state did exercise due diligence in controlling
mob violence, it can be held responsible for mob violence that
is directed specifically at foreigners.1 42 The state's responsibility may be invoked because mob violence directed at nationals
of a particular country is usually regarded as an attack upon
the nationals' state.' 43 Thus, the Greco-Bulgarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal held Bulgaria responsible for damage suffered by
a Greek 4citizen
during riots directed particularly at Greek na4
tionals.

1

It is well settled that a state is responsible for the actions
of ultimately successful revolutionaries from the inception of
the revolution. 14' This principle has been justified on the
grounds that the revolutionary movement constituted a de
facto government14 or
that the movement represented a chang6

ing national will.

ble for the actions of students because it had not instigated those actions and was not

negligent in preventing them).
14 1. Hunt, The United States-Panama General Claims Commission, 28 AM. J. INT'L L.

61, 69 (1934). In fact, the award in this case was described as punitive in nature
because the deceased had no relatives and thus there was no basis for compensatory
damages. Id. The Commission fixed damages at an amount considered necessary to
express the reparations "due by one State to another on account of its responsibility
for the death of the latter's citizen." Id.
142. Sarropoulos v. Bulgarian State, 4 Ann. Dig. 245 (Greco-Bulgarian Mixed
Arb. Trib. 1927).
143. E. BORCHARD, supra note 107, at 227-28 (the Institute of International Law
considered that aliens "have the right to compensation when injured in person or
property during mob violence where the fury of the mob is directed against aliens as
such or as subjects of a certain state"); see Sarropoulos, 4 Ann. Dig. at 245 (holding
Bulgaria absolutely responsible when riots were directed against foreigners as citizens of Greece); Goebel, The Int 'l Responsibility of States for Injuries Sustained by Aliens on
Account of Mob Violence, Insurrectionsand Civil Wars, 8 AM.J. INT'L L. 802, 812-13 (1914)

(a state is responsible for mob violence directed at foreigners as citizens of a certain
state, regardless of the care the state exercised, because such violence can be regarded as an attack upon the alien's state).
144. Sarropoulos,4 Ann. Dig. at 245. The tribunal also found that Bulgaria failed
to exercise due diligence in protecting Greek subjects. Id. The tribunal stated, however, that the state would be liable if the riots were directed against foreigners as
such or if the state failed to exercise due diligence. Id.
145. See sources cited supra note 134.
146. 1975 Draft Articles, supra note 134, at 102 ("there is no divergence of views,
no doubt whatsoever, as to the validity of the principle" that a state is responsible for
the actions of a successful revolutionary movement); see also E. BORCHARD, supra note
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A de facto government has been described as an organization that commands the support of the majority of the population.14 7 Thus, the movement can be held responsible because
of the control it exercises over the state.148 For example, Venezuela was held responsible for the actions of an ultimately
successful revolutionary movement on the theory that they
were actions of a de facto government.' 4 9 The revolutionaries
confiscated cattle belonging to a U.S. national over the course
of several months after they had successfully routed government forces.1 50 The American-Venezuelan Commission found
that during this time the "officers" of the revolutionary movement were carrying out the policy of that movement at the direction of its leader. 15 ' The Commission then stated that a
successful revolutionary government is responsible for injuries
to the same extent as "any other de facto government. "152
The Commission held the resulting government responsible
53
for the value of cattle it had confiscated.1
Revolutions have also been held to represent "a changing
' 54
national will, crystallizing in the finally successful result.'
For example, in holding Venezuela responsible for the value of
services rendered by a railway company to ultimately successful revolutionaries, the American-Venezuelan Commission
stated that the state was responsible because "it is the same
55
nation."
Whether actions are attributed to a state seems to depend
on the connection between the members of the revolutionary
107, at 241 (a revolution represents a changing national will and a successful revolution's acts may be considered at least those of a de facto government for which the
state is responsible from the beginning of the revolution).
147. B. CHENG, supra note 106, at 189 (quoting the Garrison Case). It has also
been stated that, to be considered a de facto government, the forces must be recognized as the ruling power and not as merely temporarily in control. J.N. Henriquez
Case (Neth. v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 713, 716 (c.1903).
148. B. CHENG, supra note 106, at 189-90.
149. Dix Case (Am. v. Venez.), 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 119, 120-21 (c.1903).
150. Id. at 119-20.
151. Id. at 120.

152. Id.
153. Id. at 120-21.
154. Bolivar Ry. Co. Case (Gr. Brit. v. Venez.), 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 445, 453
(c. 1903).
155. Id. at 452.
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movement and those of the resulting government.1 56 The
state has not been held responsible when losses are the result
of the "confusion and havoc of war" that is not traceable to
actions of contending military units. 157 Thus, Venezuela was
not responsible for damages sustained by a French company in
the course of insurrections in Venezuela because there was no
evidence that the government was the sole cause of the company's losses or that the government intended to injure the
company in any way. '5 The government was responsible,
however, for the "natural and consequential damages" caused
59
by the successful revolutionary movement.1
C. Causation
To hold a state responsible, a claimant's injuries must be a
proximate and natural consequence of the state's wrongful
conduct. 60 The state is not responsible for those injuries that
were not foreseeable when it acted wrongfully.' 6 ' For example, Great Britain was not held responsible for a "widespread
and murderous revolt" that occurred after the imposition of a
tax in Sierra Leone, a British Protectorate, because the govern162
ment had no reason to believe that a revolt would result.
Causation has not been found where the damages alleged
156. 1975 Draft Articles, supra note 134, at 100.

157. French Co. of Venezuelan Rys. Case (Fr. v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
285, 353-54 (c.1903).
158. Id. at 353.
159. Id. at 354.
160. Dix Case (Am. v. Venez.), 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 119, 121 (c. 1903); see also
B. CHENG, supra note 106, at 241 (only those damages that are immediate and direct
results of an action can be considered damages caused by that action).
161. Dix Case, 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 121; see Arbitrage Entre le Portugal et
l'Allemagne (Port. v. Germ.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1035, 1068-76 (1930) (discussing the immediate and direct causes of damage and the non-immediate and indirect
causes of damage) (author's translation); B. CHENG, supra note 106, at 244 ("In order
that a loss may be regarded as the consequence of an act for purposes of reparation,
either the loss has to be the proximate consequence of the act complained of, or the
act has to be the proximate cause of the loss."); Straus, supra note 106, at 924 (when a
government departs from the standards of international conduct, it will be liable for
the foreseeable injuries that result from such a breach).
162. Home Missionary Soc'y Case, I Ann. Dig. 173, 174 (British-Am. Claims
Arb. Trib. 1920). Similarly, Italy was not held responsible for the theft of a U.S.
national's property during World War II. Hoffman Claim, 22 I.L.R. 330 (Italian-U.S.
Conciliation Comm'n 1952). The Commission found that the theft could not be considered an act of war and that Italy could not be held responsible for a loss that was
not a foreseeable consequence of the war. Id. at 331.
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are remote to a state's actions. Hungary, for instance, was not
held responsible for losses sustained by a creditor after the
debtor's property was nationalized.' 63 The creditor's losses
were held to be "too remote or indirect" to hold Hungary responsible because the creditor did not establish that the debtor
would have paid his debt but for Hungary's actions.' 64 Similarly, Venezuela was held responsible only for the value of cattle that its revolutionary movement confiscated and not for
damages paid for breach of a contract to sell the cattle to a
third party because those damages were too remote to the con65
fiscation of the claimant's cattle.
III. CONSTRUCTIVE WRONGFUL EXPULSION AS A BASIS
OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
There are two factual differences between claims arising
out of the Islamic Revolution and cases in which states have
been held responsible for injuries to foreign nationals. First,
the expulsion of U.S. nationals was not specifically ordered by
the state. 1 66 Second, the expulsions were carried out through
16 7
the actions of a loosely organized revolutionary movement.
A state is usually held responsible for an unlawful expulsion
when it issues an order, in breach of an international obligation, directing the expulsion of a foreign national.' 6 In addi163. European Mortgage Series B Corp. Claim, 30 I.L.R. 122, 124-125 (U.S.
Foreign Claims Settlement Comm'n 1959).
164. Id. at 125-26. But see id. at 127 (Pace, Comm'r, dissenting) ("There is nothing remote or indirect, in my opinion, about the loss sustained by a mortgagee when
the property securing his mortgage was nationalized under conditions which have
prevailed in Hungary since 1946.").
165. Dix Case, 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 121; see also French Co. of Venezuela Rys.
Case (Fr. v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 285, 354 (c.1903) (there is unquestioned
responsibility of the respondent Government for all the necessary and consequential
injuries that resulted from the use of either the successful revolutionary forces or
then-contending governmental forces).
166. See Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at
11 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. July 14, 1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database) (an alien
is usually expelled "by a legal order issued by the State authorities").
167. Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 19 (Brower, J., dissenting) (the
Revolution succeeded without a military structure).
168. Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 11; see E. BORCHARD, supra note
107, at 54 ("In many countries expulsion is carried out by administrative order of the
minister of interior or other executive officer.");J. MOORE, supra note 107, at 3333-59
(discussing cases in which individuals are claiming damages for expulsions ordered
by Mexico and Cuba).
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tion, a state may be held responsible for the actions of revolutionaries who are ultimately successful.' 69 A state has usually
been held responsible, however, when the forces were identifiable military units. 171
Although the claims arising out of the Islamic Revolution
are factually different from cases in which a state has been held
responsible, the principles of state responsibility remain applicable.' 7 ' Under these principles the Islamic Republic should
be held responsible for injuries sustained by U.S. nationals as a
result of their expulsion from Iran.
A. Unlawful Act
Expulsion has been described as either forcible removal of
an alien from a state or a "voluntary" departure under the
threat of forcible removal.' 72 A state has the right to expel
aliens from its territory. 173 That right is ordinarily exercised
through an order of the state. 174 It seems clear, however, that
an expulsion that is an ostensibly "voluntary" departure,
under the threat of forcible removal, can occur in the absence
of an official order when the circumstances are such that an
alien has no choice but to leave. 175 Indeed, in Short v. Islamic
Republic of Iran and Rankin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the Tribunal stated that an expulsion can occur in these circum169. See sources cited supra note 134.

170. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 134.
171. Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 10; see also Rankin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. at 9 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Nov. 3,
1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database) (the Tribunal has adopted the International
Law Commission's criteria "as the most recent and authoritative statement of current
international law in this area"). See generally supra notes 20, 61 (discussing the corpus
of law applicable to cases before the Tribunal).
172. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 107, at 201; M. PELLONPAA, supra note 107, at
4.
173. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
174. See sources cited supra note 168.
175. Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 2 (Brower, J., dissenting) ("a
State's expulsion of aliens can ... occur constructively as well as by express act or
decree .... [A]n alien [may] be expelled from a country by the host government
engaging in discrete acts or omissions collectively designed to bring about his departure."); cf. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 95, at 218 ("there may be little difference

between forcible expulsion in brutal circumstances, and 'voluntary removal' promoted by laws which declare continued residence illegal and encouraged by threats
as to the consequences of continued residence").
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stances. 76 It refused, however, to find that the Ayatollah's
77
statements created such circumstances.
1. Anti-American Propaganda
The facts indicate that the Ayatollah's statements were
part of a policy designed to effect the removal of all U.S. nationals from Iran.17 8 His statements reveal that "from its very
inception, the Islamic Revolution saw the forces of world oppression, led by the United States, as its true foe."' 179 On the
day of the Shah's departure, the Ayatollah congratulated the
Iranian people for having forced the Shah to leave, but stated
that this was only a preface to final victory.'8 0 He stated that
the U.S. government had become an "enemy" of the Iranian
people and that the presence of U.S. military bases and advisors in Iran had impoverished the country."1' That same day
176. Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 11; Rankin v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. at 11 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Nov. 3, 1987)
(WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database). This principle was also stated in International
Technical Product Corp. v. Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Rep. 10, 18 (1985).
177. See Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 13-14 (the Tribunal found
that the Ayatollah's statements "were of a general nature and did not specify that
Americans should be expelled en masse"). In Rankin, the Tribunal stated that the
pronouncements of the Ayatollah could reasonably have been expected to cause harassment and violence toward U.S. nationals and that such statements were violative
of international law. Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. at 17. The Tribunal found,
however, that Rankin's departure was attributable to the revolutionary turmoil that
followed the return of the Ayatollah to Iran, and thus Rankin did not establish the
necessary link between the Ayatollah's statements and his departure. Id. at 23-24.
The Tribunal reached a similar result in Hilt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No.
324-10427-2 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Mar. 16, 1988) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN
database). It held that the claimant's departure in January 1979 was caused by the
revolutionary turmoil and thus not attributable to the Islamic Republic. WESTLAW
at 14.
178. Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 6 (Brower, J., dissenting) (the
Ayatollah's pronouncements reflect that "to rid Iran of the Shah for certain one had
also to cleanse it completely of Americans and their influence in every form"); see id.
at 6-10 (discussion of Ayatollah's statements from January 9, 1978 to November 10,
1986); see also B. RUBIN, supra note 18, at 234 (hostility toward the United States was
at the center of the Khomeinists' thinking); W. CHRISTOPHER, supra note 21, at 46 (the
United States was seen by some as "the Great Satan").
179. U.S. Embassy Occupation 'Divine Chapter',Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, South Asia, at 13 (Nov. 4, 1986).
180. Lewis, Shah's Departure Hailed in Message by Ayatollah, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,

1979, at A8, col. 5.
181. Khomeyni: U.S. Leaders Are 'Enemies' of Iranians, Foreign Broadcast Informa-

tion Service Daily Report, Middle East & North Africa, at R16 (Jan. 17, 1979). One
commentator has described the Ayatollah's view of the United States as "the richest,

19881

WRONGFUL EXPULSION

829

the Iranian people took to the streets chanting, "The shah is
gone. Now it's the Americans' turn. ' ' 1s On February 1, when
the Ayatollah returned to Iran, he proclaimed that final victory
would come only with the expulsion of all foreigners. 8 3 In the
middle of February, the Ayatollah stated that "the revolution
was only beginning and that all forms of American influence
must still be eliminated."''8 4 These proclamations indicate that
the Ayatollah intended to effect the departure of U.S. nationals.' 85 Indeed, the Tribunal stated that the Ayatollah's statements were expressly anti-American and that the circumstances in Iran made it difficult for U.S. nationals to remain in
the country. 18 6 The Tribunal still refused, however, to 8find
7
that U.S. nationals were expelled by these circumstances.
2. Breaches of the Treaty of Amity and International Law
The resulting expulsions were unlawful under the Treaty
of Amity and under general principles of international law.
The Treaty of Amity provides that U.S. nationals may be ex8
pelled only if necessary to protect the public interest of Iran.1
In addition, general principles of international law require that
an expulsion be in the public interest of the state.' 89 The expelling state has the right to determine whether the continued
most oppressive, most savage, and bloodthirsty country in the world, an international
plunderer and Satan." B. RUBIN, supra note 18, at 277.
182. B. RUBIN, supra note 18, at 243.
183. Apple, Bakhtiar Warns Foe, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1979, at Al, col. 6.
184. B. RUBIN, supra note 18, at 283.
185. Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 11,
16 (Brower, J., dissenting) (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. July 14, 1987) (WESTLAW, INTIRAN database).
186. Rankin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. at 3,
14-17, (Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Nov. 3, 1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database);
Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 10, 12; see also Yankee We've Come To Do You
In, TIME, Feb. 26, 1979, at 28, 28 ("Anti-American violence has been steadily on the
rise in Iran."); The Khomeini Era Begins, TIME, Feb. 12, 1979, at 38, 38-39 (U.S. officials
feared a "tide of anti-American sentiment"); The Shah Compromises, TIME,Jan. 8, 1979,
at 24, 25 ("for the first time the rioting took on a strongly anti-American tone").
187. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. The difficulty was in attributing
the creation of these circumstances to the state. See sources cited infra note 211 and
accompanying text.
188. Treaty of Amity, supra note 72, art. 11(3), 8 U.S.T. at 902, T.I.A.S. No.
3853, at 2, 284 U.N.T.S. at 112. The Treaty specifically provides that U.S. nationals
may be expelled from Iran "only as necessary to maintain public order, and to protect public health, morals and safety." Id.
189. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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residence of foreign nationals is contrary to the public welfare
of the state. 19 0 An expulsion, however, must be adequately
justified.'' When it is not legitimately justified, the expulsion
may be held to be arbitrary.' 9 2 In these cases, the expulsion of
U.S. nationals was not justified by the Islamic Republic as being in the public interest of the state, under either the Treaty
of Amity or under general principles of international law.
First, Iran denied that U.S. nationals had been expelled and
thus did not attempt to justify its actions. 93 Second, the
Ayatollah's statements do not justify the expulsion of U.S. nationals as in the public interest of the state. They reveal only
conclusory statements that the U.S. was an enemy of the people and the root of all of Iran's problems. 9 4 Under international law, expulsions that were justified on the basis of "motives of internal order" or "reserved political motives which
cannot be revealed" have been held to be arbitrary. 95 Moreover, where the charges raised against an expellee were of a
"vague and indefinite character, inconsistent with the admitted
facts and unsupported by any proof or corroboration whatsoever," the expellee's government has been held to be entitled
to compensation. 19 6 Thus, it seems that the Ayatollah's statements that the United States was an enemy of the people do
not legitimately justify the expulsion of U.S. nationals. Therefore, the expulsions were not legitimately justified as in the
190. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 107, at 230.
191. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 109-11, 121-23 and accompanying text.
193. Rankin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. at 2
(Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Nov. 3, 1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database); Yeager v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 324-10199-1, slip. op. at 7 (Iran-U.S. Claims
Trib. Nov. 2, 1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database); Short v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 9 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. July 14, 1987)
(WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database).
194. See B. RUBIN, supra note 18, at 267 ("Ayatollah Khomeini would be fond of
saying that the United States was the cause of all of Iran's troubles"); Visit Shows U.S.
'Despondency', Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, South Asia, at 13
(Nov. 10, 1986) (Khomeini identified the United States "as the cause of all the difficulties facing the country"). It seems that a reason for anti-American sentiment was
the frustration of Iranians over their country's economic dependence on the United
States and the belief that only U.S. support enabled the Shah to retain power. Id. at
111. Moreover, Iranians who did not understand U.S. technology felt defrauded by
the United States and their resentment increased. Id. at 136.
195. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 107, at 232-33.

196. Id. at 233 n.2.
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public interests of the state.

97

3. Reprisal
The expulsions may also be wrongful under general principles of international law because they could be considered a
reprisal against the United States. A reprisal is "a means of
'
vindication of rights infringed by another state.' 98
It is justi199
fied only against the provoking state, and must ordinarily be
preceded by resort to peaceful remedies.20 0 In this case, it is
not evident that the United States acted unlawfully toward
Iran. The Ayatollah did not identify an unlawful act of the
United States. He merely identified U.S. nationals as enemies
of the people, apparently because of the U.S. government's
support of the Shah. 20 ' Furthermore, Revolutionary Guards
and the revolutionary movement in general took threatening
actions against U.S. nationals.20 2 Thus, Iran should be held
responsible for taking actions that could be considered as an
illegal reprisal against the United States.
197. The Tribunal did not directly discuss whether the expulsions were legitimately justified in Short and Rankin because they did not find that Short and Rankin
had been expelled by an agent of the Islamic Republic. See supra note 177. The
Tribunal did state, however, in Rankin, that the Ayatollah's policy could be violative
of international law. Rankin, Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. at 18. In Yeager, the
Tribunal found that the expulsion of Yeager by Revolutionary Guards was violative
of international law and thus did not address whether the Ayatollah's statements
could have caused an expulsion. Yeager, Award No. 324-10199-1, slip. op. at 14. The
Tribunal did state, however, that the Ayatollah's statements were attributable to the
state. Id.
198. P. JESSUP, supra note 129, at 174.
199. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
200. Id.; see also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 24, at 705 (there is no obligation that
parties settle international disputes; however, if they consent to do so, the use of
force to settle those disputes is unlawful); id.
at 465 (armed reprisals are against the
United Nations Charter).
201. Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 12
(Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. July 14, 1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database); see also B.
RUBIN, supra note 18, at 241 (the United States "has backed the massacre of our
people by the shah's ignoble regime").
202. Rankin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. at 1416 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Nov. 3, 1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database); Yeager
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 324-10199-1, slip. op. at 3-5 (Iran-U.S. Claims
Trib. Nov. 2, 1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database); Short, Award No. 312-111353, slip. op. at 6-8.
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4. Manner of Expulsion
Even if the Islamic Republic were otherwise justified in expelling U.S. nationals, the expulsions were carried out in a
manner that was needlessly detrimental to the expellees. A
state may be held responsible for an expulsion that is carried
out with undue haste or that subjects the expellee to unnecessary hardship.20 3 In Yeager, the claimant was given only thirty
minutes to gather his belongings.20 4 The Tribunal found that
Yeager's expulsion was wrongful because it did not give him
"sufficient time to wind up his affairs." 20 5 In Short and Rankin,
the claimants also departed under circumstances that subjected them to unnecessary hardship. The cases illustrate that
they feared for their personal safety.20 6 As a result, they were
forced to leave in such haste that they did not have sufficient
time to arrange their affairs.20 7 Thus, the Islamic Republic

should be held responsible for the damages sustained as a result of the manner in which their expulsions were effected.

08

B. Attribution
A nation is responsible for the actions of a successful revolutionary movement.20 9 Indeed, the Tribunal recognized that
the statements of the Ayatollah are attributable to the Islamic
203. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text. The situation is similar to
President Idi Amin's mass expulsion of British subjects for allegedly sabotaging the
economy of Uganda. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text. The measure
was described as a reprisal against Great Britain for its citizens' economic success in
Uganda. See Sharma & Wooldridge, supra note 115, at 397 (the unpopularity of British subjects of Asian descent stemmed in part from their economic success and from
the fact that they maintained a different culture). The action was challenged as unlawful because it ordered the expulsion of aliens en masse, itsubjected many expellees
to unjustifiable harassment, and it was a disguised method of discrimination. See
supra notes 117, 119 and accompanying text. The unlawfulness of the action, however, was never decided. See supra note 118.
204. Yeager, Award No. 324-10199-1, slip. op. at 22.
205. Id. at 21-22.
206. Rankin, Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. at 21; Yeager, Award No. 32410199-1, slip. op. at 3; Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 6-8, 12.
207. Rankin, Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. at 3-4; Short, Award No. 31211135-3, slip. op. at 8. It seems clear that a sufficient time should be at least enough
time for U.S. nationals to arrange for the shipment of their belongings to the United
States.
208. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text. The Tribunal did not address this issue in either Short or Rankin.
209. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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Republic. 210 The major stumbling block for the Tribunal in
Short, Rankin, and Yeager was in attributing the actions of
loosely organized adherents to Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary movement.2 '
Ayatollah Khomeini was the undisputed leader of the Islamic Revolution. 2 As an ayatollah of Islamic Shi'ism,
Khomeini was seen as "literally the manifestation of God on
210. Yeager, Award No. 324-10199-1, slip. op. at 14.
211. Rankin, Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. at 13 (the question is whether the
actions that caused claimant's departure were those of mobs or of the revolutionary
movement); Yeager, Award No. 324-10199-1, slip. op. at 14, 15 (there is insufficient
evidence to attribute the actions of persons other than revolutionary guards to the
state. To attribute an act to the state, the claimant must identify with reasonable
certainty the actors and their association with the state); see also Arthur Young & Co.
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 338-484-1, WESTLAW at 22 (Iran-U.S.
Claims Trib. Dec. 1, 1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database) (when a U.S. partnership claimed that it was wrongfully expelled, the Tribunal found that it failed to identify agents of the state with sufficient certainty and thus failed to attribute their actions to the state).
An examination of cases involving the expropriation of U.S. business assets in Iran
during 1978-1979 reveals that the Tribunal has found conduct attributable to the
state only when there is a "deliberate governmental assertion of control over the
corporation, such as the substitution of Government-appointed managers." Brower,
Current Developments in the Law of Expropriationand Compensation: A Preliminary Survey of
Awards of the Iran-UnitedStates Claims Tribunal, 21 INrr'L LAw. 639, 669 (1987). "Losses
caused by revolutionary unrest not directly traceable to such a governmental action
have not generally been held to constitute compensable expropriations." Id. U.S.
corporations claimed damages resulting from alleged interference with their property by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Id. at 653-56. The Tribunal
stated in one case that "the state of administrative chaos which prevailed in Iran
throughout the first few months of 1979 make it unsafe to attribute any ...ostensibly
governmental acts to the revolutionary Government that subsequently came to
power." Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Iran (Award No. 135-33-1), 6 Iran-U.S. Claims Trib.
Rep. 149, 166 (1984). Compare Sea-Land Serv., 6 Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Rep. at 165
(the Tribunal found that the governmental interference resulted from "a state of upheaval in [the port authority's] internal management which is consistent with the general picture of disruption which characterised Iran in the months leading up to the
success of the Revolution"), and Schering Corp. v. Iran, 5 Iran-U.S. Claims Trib.
Rep. 361, 370-71 (1984) (a Workers Council of an Iranian company that blocked
payments due to its parent U.S. company was held not to be acting for the state
although the formation of these councils was initiated by the state) with William L.
Pereira Assocs., Iran v. Iran, 5 Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Rep. 198, 226-27 (1984) (a
notice of confiscation issued by Revolutionary Guards was sufficient evidence of state
action to hold the Government of Iran responsible for the value of the confiscated
property). See generally Brower, supra, at 652-56 (discussing the standards of attribution applied by the Tribunal in expropriation cases).
212. Rankin, Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. at 14; see also Yeager, Award No.
324-10199-1, slip. op. at 15 (the vast majority of the revolutionary movement supported the Ayatollah); B. RUBIN, supra note 18, at 234 (the people clearly expressed
their determination that the new government be an Islamic Republic under the
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earth. ' 2 13 He exploited his position as a religious leader to
incite the Iranian people to depose the Shah and expel all foreign influence from the country.2 14 Indeed, his statements reveal a perception of complete identity between himself and the
Iranian people. The Ayatollah stated that "we will take power
through the legitimate referendum of the streets. 2'1 5 The
Ayatollah warned the provisional government not to "wait for
an explosion so that [he] would have to get the people involved in a
holy war."' 2 16 He used his influence among the Iranian people
to carry out a revolution through demonstrations, strikes, and
propaganda rather than through conventional military
forces.21 7
The form of its revolution should not diminish the Islamic
Ayatollah's leadership), 213 (by August 1978, demonstrators were already chanting,
"Khomeini is our leaderl").
213. J. BILL & C. LEIDEN, POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 44 (2d ed. 1984).
214. See B. RUBIN, supra note 18, at 6 (within the Islamic tradition, "Iranian religious leaders were free to attack the shah's government and policies on the grounds
that they were unjust and contrary to Islam"); Khomeini Calls Shah 'Dethroned,' Vows to
Take Over, N.Y. Times,Jan. 20, 1979, at A3, cols. 4-5 (the Ayatollah evidently used his
influence as a religious leader to utilize public pressure from the people as a means
to gain power over the country); The Weekend of Crisis, TIME, Dec. 18, 1978, at 32, 37
("mullahs throughout the country repeated the inflammatory messages of Ayatullah
[sic] Khomeini, mixing religious exhortations with anti-Shah diatribes"). The political vacuum created by the Shah's 25-year ban on political expression has been filled
by Islamic fundamentalists such as the Ayatollah. Id.
215. Khomeini Calls Shah 'Dethroned,' Vows to Take Over, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1979,
at A3, col. 4 (emphasis added). Indeed, public demonstrations have been described
as a test of the Ayatollah's strength. Id. at A3, col. 5.
216. Markham, Ayatollah Steps Up Pressure on Regime To Bow Out in Iran, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 4, 1979, at Al, col. 6 (emphasis added).
217. See supra notes 178-86 and accompanying text; Short v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 19 (Brower, J., dissenting) (Iran-U.S.
Claims Trib. July 14, 1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database) (the Revolution succeeded "without the formation of a distinct and complete revolutionary military
force"); The Khomeini Era Begins, supra note 1, at 33 (the Ayatollah sent messages to
Iran "summoning the faithful" to topple the monarchy and install an Islamic Republic); Apple, A Million Marchers Rally for Khomeini in Teheran Streets, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,
1979, at A4, col. 2 (during demonstrations, copies of a resolution identifying demonstrations and strikes as the means toward the establishment of an Islamic Republic
were distributed); Gage, Shah Leaves for Indefinite Stay, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1979, at
AI, col. 6 (the Shah was deposed by popular upheaval); Lewis, Shah's DepartureHailed
in Message by Ayatollah, Jan. 17, 1979, at A8, cols. 5-6 (the Ayatollah evidently planned
to use demonstrations as one of a series of actions designed to bring down the Bakhtiar government); The Shah Compromises, TIME, Jan. 8, 1979, at 24, 25 (at the urging of
the Ayatollah, striking oil workers refused to go back to work); The Weekend of Crisis,
TIME, Dec. 18, 1978, at 32, 32 (hundreds of thousands of marchers demonstrated in
support of the Ayatollah); Enteringa Dangerous Hour, TIME, Dec. 11, 1978, at 50, 50
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Republic's responsibility for the movement's actions. A more
or less organized movement that strives for the overthrow of a
particular government, on the impetus of general discontent
or under the influence of prominent leaders, may be styled a
revolution.21 8 Moreover, a state is responsible for the actions
of revolutionaries when they are mobs as well as when they
evolve into more organized forces.21 9
Alternatively, the Islamic Republic should be held responsible because it failed to exercise due diligence to prevent injuries to U.S. nationals during the Revolution. A state is responsible for the actions of revolutionaries from the inception of
the revolution.22 ° Such actions may be either affirmative acts
or failures to act.2 2 ' In this case, it is clear that the revolutionary movement had effective control over the country and the
means to suppress mob violence. This control is illustrated by
the fact that crowds in the streets were guided by Islamic clergymen.222 Additionally, on February 6, the Ayatollah's supporters helped to keep crowds from converging on the Parliament building during meetings held there by the Shah's provisional government. 223 In fact, the revolutionary movement
used its control over the state to promulgate, rather than suppress, anti-American actions.2 2 4 Thus, the Islamic Republic
should be held responsible for failing to exercise due diligence
(the Ayatollah called for a general strike and urged oil workers to repeat a two-week
strike).
218. Georges Pinson Case, 4 Ann. Dig. 239, 241 (Fr. and Mex. Mixed Claims
Comm'n 1928). In Rankin, the Tribunal found that the actions of revolutionaries in
response to the Ayatollah's statements were attributable to the Islamic Republic.
Rankin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 326-10913-2, slip. op. at 17 (Iran-U.S.
Claims Trib. Nov. 3, 1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database). It did not find, however, that such statements and actions caused Rankin's departure. Id. On the other
hand, in Short, the Tribunal stated that the "acts of supporters of a revolution cannot
be attributed to the government following the success of the revolution." Short,
Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 13. Further, the Ayatollah's statements were not
found to be the cause of Short's departure. Id. at 14.
219. D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 968 (2d ed. 1970).

220. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
221. B. CHENG, supra note 106, at 174.
222. Markham, Both Iran Factions Give Demonstration of Their Strength, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 7, 1979, at A6, col. 3.
223. Id. at Al, col. 1.
224. See supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text; see also Waitingfor the Ayatullah [sic], TIME, Feb. 5, 1979, at 42, 43-44 ("From the start of his exile... Khomeini
laid the groundwork for the revolution in talks with his students. Taped cassettes
carried his message back to the mosques in Iran.... When the time came to mount
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2 25
to control the actions of the revolutionary movement.
The Islamic Republic may also be held responsible because the mob violence was directed specifically at U.S. nationals. 22 6 A state may be held responsible regardless of the care it
exercised because mob violence directed at nationals of a particular country is usually regarded as an attack upon the nationals' state. 2 27 The mob violence in these cases during the
Islamic Revolution definitely took on an anti-American tone. 2 8
Thus, the Islamic Republic should be held responsible for the
injuries sustained by U.S. nationals, regardless of the care it
exercised, because the mob violence was expressly directed at
citizens of the United States.

C. Causation
The expulsion of U.S. nationals from Iran was a proximate
and natural consequence of the actions of the revolutionary
movement. After February 1979, anti-American sentiment escalated and the revolution intensified. 22 9' All but 5000 of the
45,000 U.S. nationals who had lived in Iran prior to September
1978 had left the country by the middle of February 1979.30
Approximately 1500 U.S. nationals have since brought wrongful expulsion cases arising from departures in February
1979.231 It seems likely that at least this small percentage was
strikes and demonstrations, a whole network of mosques, Islamic schools and neighborhood associations was in place.").
225. C. DEVISSCHER, supra note 133, at 286. It is difficult to exempt the Islamic
Republic from responsibility when the facts actually indicate that it exercised control
over Iran. See id. at 289; supra text accompanying notes 221-24. But see Yeager v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 324-10199-1, slip. op. at 8, (Iran-U.S. Claims
Trib. Nov. 2,1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database); Short v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 13 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. July 14, 1987)
(WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database) (the Islamic Republic argued that it had not consolidated its control over the country at the time of the expulsions of the U.S. nationals in these cases).
226. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
227. See sources cited supra note 143.
228. See sources cited supra note 186.
229. B. RUBIN, supra note 18, at 280; see also, R. ANDERSON, R. SEIBERT &J. WAGNER, POLITICS AND CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 117 (1982) (the Ayatollah's return to
Iran on February 1 "brought a massive outpouring of popular approval").
230. The Khomeini Era Begins, TIME, Feb. 12, 1979, at 33, 39; see also Guns, Death,
and Chaos, TIME, Feb. 26, 1979, at 26, 30 (the U.S. prepared to evacuate the 5000 to
7000 U.S. nationals still in Iran).
231. Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 15-
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The circum-

stances, particularly after the return of the Ayatollah on February 1, cast doubt on the proposition that all U.S. nationals
chose to leave Iran voluntarily.233
Moreover, the United States and its nationals had established profitable business relationships in Iran. U.S. corporations had invested heavily in the country and U.S. companies
were committed to long-term contracts.2 3 4 Iran was also a valuable location from which the U.S. government could monitor
activities of the Soviet Union. 23 ' Although U.S. corporations,
such as BHI, had begun to evacuate their personnel, their employees were not obligated to leave Iran.23 6 Nor were they
bound by U.S. Embassy recommendations to leave.23 7 These
ties indicate that U.S. nationals would have remained in Iran
the anti-American violence instigated by the Ayatolbut for
8
lah. 23
The expulsions were a foreseeable result of, and not remote from, the actions of the revolutionary movement. In fact,
the actions were part of an intentional policy designed to bring
about the departure of U.S. nationals.239 In light of the deliberate policy carried out by the proponents of the Revolution, it
seems clear that the expulsion of U.S. nationals was a direct
consequence of the actions of the revolutionaries.24 °
16 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib.July 14, 1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database) (Brower,
J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 16.
233. Id. at 13-15; see also Rankin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 32610913-2, slip. op. at 3-4 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Nov. 3, 1987) (WESTLAW, INTIRAN database); Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 324-10199-1, slip.
op. at 3-5 (Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Nov. 2, 1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN
database); Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 7-8.
234. Kilborn, Iranian Festival is Over for American Business, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,
1979, at A10, cols. 5-6; see also Robinson, Recent Developments at the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, 17 INT'L LAw. 661, 661 (1983) (during the Islamic Revolution, the
extensive economic and commercial ties between the U.S. and Iran were ruptured).
235. See Middleton, Loss of Devices Watching Soviet a Serious Casualty of Iran Crisis,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1979, at A14, col. 1 (discussing the dismantling of the Central
Intelligence Agency's "strategic-weapons monitoring system" in Iran).
236. Yeager, Award No. 324-10199-1, slip. op. at 19-20.
237. Id. at 20.
238. Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 14
(Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. July 14, 1987) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database) (Brower, J.,
dissenting).
239. See sources cited supra note 178.
240. Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 15 (Brower, J., dissenting). This
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Thus, as Judge Brower argued, there should be a rebuttable
presumption that the departure of U.S. nationals after the return of Ayatollah Khomeini on February 1 was caused by the
anti-American stance of the revolutionary movement.2 4 '
CONCLUSION
The constructive wrongful expulsion of foreigners by the
actions of revolutionary mobs, instigated by state-inspired
propaganda, is within a state's responsibility for injuries to
aliens. It is evident that the masses of Iranian people who supported the Ayatollah heeded his directives and took anti-American actions that deliberately caused the departure of U.S. nationals. A nation should be responsible when a mob, moved
by state-inspired propaganda, forces aliens to leave the country. Under such circumstances, as in the case of the Islamic
Revolution, foreign nationals may be constructively expelled in
the absence of an official order. Whether the propaganda
stems from the constituted authority of a state or from an ultimately successful revolutionary movement does not alter the
state's responsibility for the consequences of those statements.
Ruth L. Cove*
conclusion was not clear to the Tribunal, which did not find the revolutionary turmoil
to be caused by actions of persons that were attributable to the state. See supra notes
177, 218.
241. Short, Award No. 312-11135-3, slip. op. at 22 (Brower, J., dissenting). But
see Short, slip. op. at 11 (to assume that all departures were attributable to the Islamic
Republic unless the state demonstrated otherwise is contrary to international law).
* J.D. candidate, 1989, Fordham University.

